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ENHANCED INTERROGATION, THE REPORT ON
RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION, AND THE
RETURN OF KRIEGSRAISON
Benjamin R. Farley
Last year’s release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report
on Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI Report) brought with it a
renewed debate over the United States’ so-called enhanced interrogation
program in the years following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The debate
itself is tremendously disheartening for a variety of reasons, not least of which
is its focus on the efficacy of torture.1 Defenders of the enhanced interrogation
program posit that enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were militarily
 J.D. with Honors, Emory University School of Law, 2011. Editor-in-Chief, Emory International Law
Review, 2010-2011. M.A., The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, 2007.
Presidential Management Fellow 2012–2014. Senior Adviser to the Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at
the U.S. Department of State. The opinions and views expressed are those of the author alone. They do not
represent the views of the United States.
1 John Yoo, Opinion, Dianne Feinstein’s Flawed Torture Report, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-yoo-torture-feinstein-20141214-story.html (“But the Feinstein report
has one positive virtue: It has moved the debate beyond legality to effectiveness.”); Angus S. King, Torture
and the Arc of History, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/senangus-s-king-jr/torture-and-the-arc-of-hi_b_6361304.html (“The second basic question . . . is whether torture
works—is it an effective tool for extracting otherwise unavailable information which may save thousands or
even millions of lives.”); George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss, Michael V. Hayden, et al., Ex-CIA Directors:
Interrogations Saved Lives, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-interrogationssaved-lives-1418142644. Some hold the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence responsible for injecting
efficacy into the torture debate by seeking to debunk the utility of torture. Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on the
SSCI Report, Part III: The Program’s Effectiveness, LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2014, 11:32 PM), http://www.law
fareblog.com/2014/12/thoughts-on-the-ssci-report-part-iii-the-programs-effectiveness/ (“It was the committee
majority that was not content to argue merely that the program was immoral and illegal but insisted on arguing
that it was entirely ineffective as well.”). However, utility has long figured prominently in the defense of the
enhanced interrogation program. E.g., LEON PANETTA, WORTHY FIGHTS 223 (2014) (“The CIA got important
even critical intelligence from individuals subjected to these enhanced interrogation techniques”); GEORGE W.
BUSH, DECISION POINTS 168–69 (2011) (“I knew that an interrogation program this sensitive and controversial
would one day become public. When it did, we would open ourselves up to criticism that America had
compromised our moral values . . . But the choice between security and values was real. Had I not authorized
waterboarding on senior Al Qaeda leaders, I would have had to accept a greater risk that the country would be
attacked . . . I approved the use of the interrogation techniques. The new techniques proved highly effective.”);
Siobhan Gorman, Brennan Critics Zero in on CIA’s Interrogations, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 9, 2013) (“There has
been a lot of information that has come out from these interrogation procedures that the agency has in fact used
against the real hard-core terrorists. It has saved lives.”) (quoting Director of Central Intelligence John
Brennan) (internal quotations omitted), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732444230457823211
3740569812 .
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necessary to prevent additional terrorist attacks against the United States and
defeat al-Qaeda. They argue that the United States and al-Qaeda were engaged
in an armed conflict2 following the 9/11 attacks, and that intelligence
concerning future terrorist attacks and the al-Qaeda organization was required
to prevent such attacks and to defeat al-Qaeda.3 According to defenders of
EITs, those techniques were militarily necessary because members of al-Qaeda
who were detained in the course of the armed conflict following the 9/11
attacks possessed critical intelligence information. Moreover, according to EIT
defenders, the detainees who held critical intelligence information were trained
to resist normal interrogation techniques; or, in some cases, the information
they possessed was so time-sensitive that normal, lawful interrogation
techniques were insufficient.4 In the face of these challenges, the United States
was compelled to resort to EITs—interrogation techniques that were beyond
those normally authorized in law-enforcement or intelligence gathering
efforts—to extract information critical to protecting the United States and
defeating al-Qaeda.5 Critically, EIT defenders argue that those techniques were
in fact effective means of extracting information from detainees, and that

2 See, e.g., DCI Talking Points: CIA Detainee Issues (July 2, 2004), http://ciasavedlives.com/bdr/dcitalking-pts-cia-detainee-issues.pdf (“Under other circumstances, earlier in this war, we would have
immediately asked . . . to give . . . to us, and we would have rendered him to another site.”) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
3 According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA relied on examples of specific
terrorist plots supposedly thwarted through the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques [that] were not only
effective, but also necessary to acquire ‘otherwise unavailable’ actionable intelligence that ‘saved lives.’” S.
REP. NO. 113-288, at xi (2014) [hereinafter RDI REPORT] (internal quotations omitted). See also Memorandum
for John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative
(Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rizzo Interrogation Memorandum]; Memorandum for the National Security
Adviser, Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Interrogation Program (July 3, 2003) (“As you
know, the primary national interest in interrogating [High Value Detainees] is to acquire critical intelligence
that may be exploited by the United States to prevent future terrorist attacks. To accomplish that mission, CIA
developed an Interrogation Program that includes the use of enhanced interrogation techniques to assist in
obtaining that critical intelligence.”).
4 E.g., Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency,
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees 5 (May 30, 2005)
[hereinafter Rizzo Memorandum on Obligations Under Article 16] (explaining the criteria for applying
enhanced interrogation techniques to detainees); Rizzo Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1–4
(describing Abu Zubaydah’s supposed possession of critical intelligence and resistance to extant interrogation
techniques); Bill Hoffman, John Yoo: I Was Never Asked to Testify for Torture Report, NEWSMAX (Dec. 11,
2014), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/John-Yoo-torture-report-Dianne-Feinstein-waterboarding/20
14/12/11/id/612526/ (noting that John Yoo claims enhanced interrogation techniques “absolutely saved lives”).
5 E.g., Rizzo Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
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information actually contributed to the defense of the United States and the
defeat of al-Qaeda.6
Defenders of enhanced interrogation invoke these necessity and efficacy
arguments when confronted by questions concerning the legality of the
enhanced interrogation program.7 But some methods used in the course of the
enhanced interrogation program, including waterboarding,8 constitute torture.9
6

E.g., Rizzo Memorandum on Obligations Under Article 16, supra note 4, at 8 (citing Memorandum for
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Office of Legal Counsel, Effectiveness of
the CIA Counterintelligence Interrogation Techniques (Mar. 2, 2005)) (“[T]he CIA believes that ‘the
intelligence acquired from [enhanced] interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch
a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001.’”). But see RDI REPORT, supra note 3, at 172–452
(describing CIA representations in public and classified settings concerning the efficacy of enhanced
interrogation techniques); Michael Hirsh, Michael Hayden is Not Sorry, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 9, 2014), http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/torture-report-michael-hayden-not-sorry-113450; Tenet, Goss,
Hayden et al., supra note 1.
7 See generally RDI REPORT, supra note 3.
8 Waterboarding, as defined by the U.S. government, consists of
[Securely binding an individual] to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven
feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes.
Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered
until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the
mouth and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the
cloth. This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual’s blood. This increase in
the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces
the perception of “suffocation and incipient panic,” i.e., the perception of drowning. The
individual does not breathe any water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is
continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is
lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The
sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may
then be repeated.
Rizzo Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 3. It is worth comparing the U.S. government’s definition of
waterboarding with the descriptions of the “water cure,” an interrogation technique employed by some U.S.
military personnel during the counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines in 1902—and for which a handful
of soldiers were court martialed: “[A] cloth was placed over the detainee’s mouth and nose and water poured
over it producing a drowning sensation.” Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water
Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 474, 494–95, 501 (2007).
9 E.g., President Barack Obama, Press Conference at the White House (Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-4292009 (“What I’ve said—and I will repeat—is
that waterboarding violates our ideals and our values. I do believe that it is torture. I don’t think that’s just my
opinion; that’s the opinion of many who’ve examined the topic. And that’s why I put an end to these practices.
I am absolutely convinced it was the right thing to do—not because there might not have been information that
was yielded by these various detainees who were subjected to this treatment, but because we could have gotten
this information in other ways, in ways that were consistent with our values, in ways that were consistent with
who we are . . . I believe that waterboarding was torture. And I think that the—whatever legal rationales were
used, it was a mistake.”); Dana Carver Boehm, Waterboarding, Counter-Resistance, and the Law of Torture:
Articulating the Legal Underpinnings of U.S. Interrogation Policy, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 14–15, 19–41 (2009)
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As such, use of these techniques on individuals detained in the course of an
armed conflict violates international law’s absolute prohibition on torture, as
well as international humanitarian law’s prescription to treat all individuals
rendered hors de combat humanely.10 Thus, to the extent that defenders of
(arguing that although waterboarding is torture, most other Bush Administration-approved EITs are not);
Wolfgang Form, Charging Waterboarding as a Crime: U.S. War Crime Trials in the Far East After World
War II, 2 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 247 (2011); Lindsey Graham & Paul R. Connolly, Waterboarding: Issues and
Lessons for Judge Advocates, 69 A.F. L. REV. 65, 85 (2013) (“There may continue to be some debate about
other interrogation techniques that are aggressive, but not unlawful, but there should be no disagreement on the
legality of waterboarding. Restraining someone on their back and forcing water into their mouth and nose to
suffocate them until they feel like they are about to die is unlawful and violates military regulations and both
domestic and international law. We conclude that waterboarding, particularly when used repeatedly, rises to
the level of inflicting severe physical or mental pain and suffering, and therefore violates Common Article 3
and the Torture Convention.”); Daniel Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: Legal Interpretation and the
Continuing Struggle for Human Rights, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 205 (2009) (“Waterboarding has
long been understood as torture, from its earliest incarnations during the Spanish Inquisition through its
systematic use by the Khmer Rouge.”). Kanstroom also argues that whether waterboarding is properly defined
as torture, it clearly violates Common Article 3 and, for that reason, is illegal. Id. at 213; Jordan J. Paust, The
Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1553–57
(2009); Wallach, supra note 8, at 468. Cf. Hernandez-Barrera v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 9, 15–23 (1st Cir. 2004)
(finding that the “water torture,” or submerging an individual’s head in water, qualifies as torture for purposes
of demonstrating past persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act) (“[Plaintiff] was subjected to
persecution and torture . . . [h]e stated that his commanders . . . submerged his head in water.”); In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D. Haw. 1995) (asserting that placing a cloth over a
detainee’s mouth and nose and pouring water over it to produce a sensation of drowning is a form of torture).
See also President Barack Obama, Press Conference at the White House (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01/press-conference-president (“With respect to the larger point of
the RDI report itself . . . [w]e did a whole lot of things that were right, but we tortured some folks. We did
some things that were contrary to our values.”); Christopher Hitchens, Believe Me, It’s Torture, VANITY FAIR
(Aug. 2008), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/08/hitchens200808 (“You may have read by now the
official lie about this treatment, which is that it ‘simulates’ the feeling of drowning. This is not the case. You
feel that you are drowning because you are drowning—or, rather, being drowned, albeit slowly and under
controlled conditions and at the mercy (or otherwise) of those who are applying the pressure.”); William
Safire, On Language: Waterboarding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/
magazine/09wwlnSafire-t.html?_r=0 (“If the word torture . . . means anything (and it means ‘the deliberate
infliction of excruciating physical or mental pain to punish or coerce’), then waterboarding is a means of
torture. The predecessor terms for its various forms are water torture, water cure and water treatment.”)
(emphasis in original).
10 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. All persons rendered hors de combat, including by detention, must be treated
humanely. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 137–39 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“[T]he proposition is warranted that a general prohibition
against torture has evolved in customary international law. This prohibition has gradually crystallised from the
Lieber Code and The Hague Conventions, in particular articles 4 and 46 of the Regulations annexed to
Convention IV of 1907, read in conjunction with the ‘Martens clause’ laid down in the Preamble to the same
Convention. Torture was not specifically mentioned in the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 establishing
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg . . . but it was one of the acts expressly classified as a crime
against humanity under article II(1)(c) of Allied Control Council Law No. 10 . . . As stated above, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols of 1977 prohibit torture in terms. That these treaty provisions have

FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL

2015]

12/11/2015 1:10 PM

ENHANCED INTERROGATION

2023

enhanced interrogation seek to excuse or justify use of illegal interrogation
techniques under the guise of military necessity, they are actually invoking
kriegsraison—a long-discredited military doctrine that holds that the laws of
war may be overcome in the face of extreme danger or simply to achieve the
object of the war.
From a legal perspective, the invalidity of kriegsraison is or should be selfevident. It is an invitation to lawlessness and barbarism. Despite the
compelling reasons to abhor kriegsraison, the doctrine’s essential logic is
tempting. Why should mere law prevent states from using all available means
to protect their citizens and defeat their enemies? Ultimately, the laws of war
reflect the realization that—far from being necessary for victory11—savagery is
actually counterproductive.12 Compliance with the laws of war “is not fighting
with one hand tied behind one’s back. Rather, law of war principles and rules
are consistent with military doctrines for a profession of arms that are the basis
for effective combat operations.”13 Kriegsraison, on the other hand, vests a
commander in the field with potentially unreviewable authority to determine
what is militarily necessary and whether to contravene every principle limiting
the means and methods of warfare, every protection for civilians, developed
ripened into customary rules is evinced by various factors. First, these treaties and in particular the Geneva
Conventions have been ratified by practically all States of the world. Admittedly those treaty provisions
remain as such and any contracting party is formally entitled to relieve itself of its obligations by denouncing
the treaty (an occurrence that seems extremely unlikely in reality); nevertheless the practically universal
participation in these treaties shows that all States accept among other things the prohibition of torture. In other
words, this participation is highly indicative of the attitude of States to the prohibition of torture. Secondly, no
State has ever claimed that it was authorised to practice torture in time of armed conflict, nor has any State
shown or manifested opposition to the implementation of treaty provisions against torture. When a State has
been taken to task because its officials allegedly resorted to torture, it has normally responded that the
allegation was unfounded, thus expressly or implicitly upholding the prohibition of this odious practice.
Thirdly, the International Court of Justice has authoritatively, albeit not with express reference to torture,
confirmed this custom-creating process: in the Nicaragua case it held that common article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which inter alia prohibits torture against persons taking no active part in hostilities, is
now well-established as belonging to the corpus of customary international law and is applicable both to
international and internal armed conflicts. It therefore seems incontrovertible that torture in time of armed
conflict is prohibited by a general rule of international law. In armed conflicts this rule may be applied both as
part of international customary law and – if the requisite conditions are met – qua treaty law, the content of the
prohibition being the same.”); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTZ ET AL., INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 306, 315 (2009); DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 492–94 (2015) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
11 L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 226–27 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1948); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196–98 (5th ed. 1967). Cf. Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
12 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1055–56.
13 Id.
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through the history of war. For those reasons, kriegsraison was never widely
accepted.
Moreover, it is not necessary to speculate as to the horrors that might
emerge in warfare if kriegsraison were valid. The twentieth century’s world
wars provide ample evidence of the barbarism that may attend warfare when it
is waged outside of the bounds of the laws of war, as well as examples of
perpetrators invoking kriegsraison to avoid accountability for violating the
laws of war. Nevertheless, the temptation to wage war outside the bounds of
the law is strong—particularly when the illegal means or methods of warfare
are labeled necessary, effective, life-saving. Thus, it is important for lawyers,
scholars, and policymakers to recognize when proponents of a specific means
or method rely on kriegsraison14 to justify their preferred courses of action.
And it is incumbent upon lawyers, scholars, and policymakers to state clearly
that those means and methods of warfare are illegal, as is the doctrine their
proponents have invoked to justify them.
This Essay demonstrates that defenders of enhanced interrogation have
relied, and continue to rely, on kriegsraison to justify the United States’ use of
enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Qaeda detainees following the attacks
of September 11, 2001. It begins by examining the clear and continuing
rejection of kriegsraison at international law, with particular reference to
international tribunals since World War II to demonstrate the unambiguous
invalidity of the doctrine. It then traces the development of arguments
justifying enhanced interrogation since November 2001, highlighting the role
kriegsraison has played in the legal and rhetorical justifications throughout,
and concluding that ultimately defenders of enhanced interrogation have
resorted to kriegsraison to excuse the illegal use of waterboarding and other
prohibited methods of interrogation during the course of the United States’
armed conflict with al-Qaeda.

14

Cf. Kanstroom, supra note 9, at 212 (“‘Once torture has been acclimatized in a legal system it spreads
like an infectious disease. It saves the labour of investigation. It hardens and brutalizes those who have become
accustomed to use it.’”) (quoting William Holdsworth); Tina Nguyen, Jeb Bush: Maybe We Shouldn’t Rule
Out Torture, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 14, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/08/jeb-bushwont-rule-out-torture (describing Republican candidate for President Jeb Bush’s refusal to rule out using
torture to acquire intelligence if elected President).
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I. THE UNLAWFUL DOCTRINE OF KRIEGSRAISON
Kriegsraison—short for kriegsraison geht vor kriegsmanier—perverts the
notion of military necessity, one of the four fundamental principles of
international humanitarian law,15 into carte blanche excusing all violations of
the law of war.16 Military necessity, as it is properly understood, does not
perform such absolution for those engaged in an armed conflict. Instead,
military necessity justifies a party to an armed conflict’s use of all measures
necessary to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible, so long as those measures
are not forbidden by international law.17 Thus, lawful military necessity is selflimiting—the measures employed must be indispensable and they must not be
forbidden by international law. As Francis Lieber enjoined more than a
century-and-a-half ago, “military necessity . . . consists in the necessity of
those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”18
In contrast to lawful military necessity, kriegsraison holds that the laws of
war “lose their force in case of extreme necessity . . . when violation of the
laws of war alone offers either a means of escape from extreme danger or the
realisation of the purpose of war.”19 That is, “a battlefield commander is
entitled to dispense with the rules of warfare if he determines that the military
situation requires that he do so.”20 The doctrine deems any departure from
international law permissible so long as “a belligerent deems [that departure]
necessary for the success of its military operations.”21 Kriegsraison has been
invoked in attempts to excuse illegal acts such as by submariners who
machine-gunned survivors of a torpedoed vessel,22 individuals who mistreated
15 LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 35 (2012).
The four fundamental principles of international humanitarian law are military necessity, humanity,
distinction, and proportionality. Id.
16 E.g., Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 263 (2013).
17 E.g., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 52; JEFF A. BOVARNICK ET AL., LAW OF WAR
DESKBOOK 129 (Brian J. Bill ed., 129th ed. 2010).
18 RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48 (1983) (emphasis added).
Indeed, “some of the conventional rules regulating warfare are actually qualified by express reference to
military necessity.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 233 n.3. Cf. Hague Convention IV, supra note 11, at pmbl.
19 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 232.
20 Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration’s Wilhelmine Attitude
Towards the Conduct of War, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 576, 585 (2006).
21 Elihu Root, Opening Address, in 15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 2 (1921); William G. Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 251, 253
(1953).
22 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 233; UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, The Peleus Trial, in LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1947) (invoking the defense of “operational” necessity).
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and compelled labor from prisoners of war,23 plunderers,24 and those who
engaged in reprisal killings of civilians.25
Kriegsraison was never widely accepted due to the obvious risk it poses of
being an exception capable of swallowing all the rules found in the laws of
war.26 The military tribunals charged with trying war crimes following World
War II seemingly consigned the doctrine to the dustbin of history.27 In addition
to those military tribunals, kriegsraison has been rejected by modern scholars,
as well as the authoritative commentary to Additional Protocol I.28 This section
23

The Krupp Case, in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1344, 1346 (Leon Friedman ed.,

1972).
24

Id.
The Hostage Case, in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1303, 1317 (Leon Friedman
ed., 1972).
26 ROOT, supra note 21, at 3 (“Either the doctrine of kriegsraison must be abandoned definitely and
finally, or there is an end of international law, and in its place will be left a world without law.”). See also L.
OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 84–85 (2d ed. 1912). Although the doctrine of kriegsraison
is generally attributed to Germans writ large, it was met with skepticism from German scholars, as well. Id.
27 E.g., Horton, supra note 20, at 589 (“The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were generally viewed as
the death knell of the doctrine of Kriegsraison.”); MICHAEL SCHMITT, Military Necessity and Humanity in
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE
FAULT LINES 89, 91 (2012). Importantly, the International Military Tribunal was able to draw a fine distinction
between valid military necessity and invalid kriegsraison. For example, in The High Command Case, the
Tribunal remarked, “The devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the usages of war is that not
warranted by military necessity. This rule is clear enough but the factual determination as to what constitutes
military necessity is difficult. Defendants in this case were in many instances in retreat under arduous
conditions wherein their commands were in serious danger of being cut off. Under such circumstances, a
commander must necessarily make quick decisions to meet the particular situation of his command. A great
deal of latitude must be accorded to him under such circumstances. What constitutes devastation beyond
military necessity in these situations requires detailed proof of an operational and tactical nature. We do not
feel that in this case the proof is ample to establish the guilt of any defendant herein on this charge.” The High
Command Case, in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
COUNCIL CONTROL LAW NO. 10, at 1, 541 (1949).
28 Commentary to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ¶ 1386, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (“A number of different theories, of which some are still in existence, seek
to contest the validity of the rule as such, i.e., the rule contained in the paragraph under consideration. The best
known of these, though it is now out of date, was expressed by the maxim ‘Kriegsraison geht vor
Kriegsmanier’ (‘the necessities of war take precedence over the rules of war’), or ‘Not kennt kein Gebot’
(‘necessity knows no law’). These maxims imply that the commander on the battlefield can decide in every
case whether the rules will be respected or ignored, depending on the demands of the military situation at the
time. It is quite obvious that if combatants were to have the authority to violate the laws of armed conflict
every time they consider this violation to be necessary for the success of an operation, the law would cease to
exist. Law is a restraint which cannot be confused with more usages to be applied when convenient. The
doctrine of ‘Kriegsraison’ was still applied during the Second World War. It is possibly the uncertainty as to
the applicability of the Hague law in conditions which had changed considerably since 1907 that contributed to
this to some extent. However, it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt for
the law, the weakening of which is may be characteristic and a danger of our age. ‘Kriegsraison’ was
25
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discusses several examples of international tribunals considering and rejecting
kriegsraison or otherwise limiting military necessity in a manner that suggests
the invalidity of kriegsraison.
A. Kriegsraison as Considered and Rejected by the International Military
Tribunals following World War II
Following World War II, the military tribunals established in Europe and
Asia by the victorious allied powers to try accused war criminals were forced
to confront numerous defenders who excused seeming violations of the laws of
war on the basis of kriegsraison. Although the doctrine was never widely
accepted,29 it had obtained certain currency within the Nazi Wehrmacht,30 and
various defendants invoked kriegsraison to avoid criminal liability for the acts
they ordered or perpetrated during the course of World War II.31 These
tribunals soundly rejected kriegsraison, and drew a fine distinction between
unlawful kriegsraison and valid military necessity.
In one of the clearest rejections of kriegsraison following World War II, an
American military tribunal operating under the Control Council Law in United
States v. Wilhelm List, et al. (The Hostage Case),32 faced defendants who
invoked military necessity as a defense for “the killing of innocent members of
the [occupied] population and the destruction of villages and towns in the
occupied territory.”33 In The Hostage Case, defendants were accused of, inter
alia, mass murder for the taking of hostages and employing reprisal killings to
dissuade the local partisan guerrilla campaign waged against the German
occupation.34 Following the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece by German
condemned at Nuremberg, and this condemnation has been confirmed by legal writings. One can and should
consider this theory discredited.”).
29 In fact, the doctrine was implicitly rejected by a German tribunal following World War I in the
Llandovery Castle Case. The Llandovery Castle Case, Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International
Law, in 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 722–23 (1922) (emphasizing that the killing of individuals in lifeboats “could
be nothing else but a breach of the law”).
30 The Hostage Case, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1255 (1950) (citing Introduction to GERMAN WAR BOOK (J. H.
Morgan trans., John Murray ed., 1915)).
31 Id.; United States v. von Leeb (High Command), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 541 (1950); United States v.
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (Krupp), in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1340 (1950).
32 The Hostage Case, in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1303, 1318–19 (1972).
33 Id. at 1318.
34 Id. at 1305 (“[D]efendants were principals or accessories to the murder of hundreds of thousands of
persons from the civilian populations of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania by troops of the German armed
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forces, members of the civilian population took up arms to resist the
occupation.35 German forces resorted to detaining members of the civilian
populace who were not engaged in the resistance under threat of death to quell
the resistance. When the taking of hostages—though lawful36—proved
insufficient to prevent partisan attacks targeting German occupation forces, the
German forces used increasingly “severe and harsh measures,”37 including the
killing of those innocents previously taken hostage.38
In response to the charges he faced, Field Marshall Wilhelm List, the
German officer responsible for the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece,
invoked military necessity.39 “Military necessity has been invoked by the
defendants as justifying the killing of innocent members of the population and
the destruction of villages and towns in the occupied territory.”40 But the
tribunal concluded that “[i]t is apparent from the evidence of these defendants
that they considered military necessity, a matter to be determined by them, a
complete justification of their acts.”41 Rightly characterizing List’s invocation
of military necessity as a resort to kriegsraison,42 the tribunal opined that
[Military necessity] permits the destruction of life of armed enemies
and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by
the armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of armed
enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the
killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the
43
satisfaction of a lust to kill.

Rejecting the legality of kriegsraison, the tribunal found that “International
Law is prohibitive law . . . . The rights of the innocent population therein set
forces; that attacks by lawfully constituted enemy military forces, and attacks by unknown persons, against
German troops and installations, were followed by executions of large numbers of the civilian population by
hanging or shooting without benefit of investigation or trial; that thousands of noncombatants, arbitrarily
designated as ‘partisans,’ ‘Communists,’ ‘Communist suspects,’ ‘bandit suspects’ were terrorized, tortured,
and murdered in retaliation for such attacks by lawfully constituted enemy military forces and attacks by
unknown persons; and that defendants issued, distributed, and executed orders for the execution of 100
‘hostages’ in retaliation for each German soldier killed and 50 ‘hostages’ in retaliation for each German soldier
wounded.”)
35 The Hostage Case, supra note 30, at 1243, 1245–46.
36 Id. at 1250–51.
37 Id. at 1260.
38 Id. at 1272.
39 Id. at 1253.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1255.
42 Id. at 1272.
43 Id. at 1253.
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forth must be respected even if military necessity or expediency decree
otherwise.”44 Moreover,
It is quite evident that the High Command insisted upon a campaign
of intimidation and terrorism as a substitute for additional troops.
Here again the German theory of expediency and military necessity
(Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier) superseded established rules of
[I]nternational [L]aw. As we have previously stated in this opinion,
the rules of [I]nternational Law must be followed even if it results in
the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot
warrant their violation . . . . As a last resort, hostages and reprisal
prisoners may be shot in accordance with international custom and
practice. If adequate troops were not available or if the lawful
measures against the population failed in their purpose, the occupant
could limit its operations or withdraw from the country in whole or in
part, but no right existed to pursue a policy in violation of
45
[I]nternational [L]aw.

Thus, the American military tribunal rejected List’s invocation of kriegsraison
and concluded that, as a matter of law, military necessity is limited to those
acts that are otherwise lawful under the laws of war.
B. Modern Judicial Rejection of Kriegsraison
More recent international jurisprudence confirms the continuing invalidity
and illegality of kriegsraison. The post-World War II jurisprudence implicitly
rejects kriegraison by affirming that military necessity is limited and that
certain proscriptions on the means or methods of warfare may not be
overcome—even in the face of a plea of military necessity.
For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has charged individuals with, and convicted them for, violations of the
customary international humanitarian law like torture that admit no exception
based on military necessity.46 In Prosecutor v. Furundžija, a Croatian and a
commander of a special unit of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO),47 was
charged with, inter alia, torture for his role in the interrogation of a BosnianMuslim woman with alleged connections to the Bosnian Army.48 Although the
44

Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1272–73.
46 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
47 Id. ¶ 262.
48 Id. ¶¶ 39–50.
45
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woman may have possessed useful intelligence of military value,49 military
necessity played no role in the accused’s defense50 nor in the trial chamber’s
determination of the accused’s guilt. Instead, the trial chamber took pains to
explain the scope of international law’s prohibition on torture51 and the
international community’s “revulsion against torture.”52 The ICTY’s
recognition of an absolute prohibition on a method of warfare like torture is an
implicit rejection of the doctrine of kriegsraison.
The ICTY demonstrated an even clearer rejection of kriegsraison in a
series of cases addressing attacks directed at civilians and civilian populations.
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić,53 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Ĉerkez,54 and Prosecutor v.
Galić, the ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers affirmed the absolute prohibition
on directly targeting civilians in the course of an armed conflict,55 and
specifically rejected the claim that military necessity could overcome that
absolute bar. Most precisely, the Galić Trial Chamber stated that Article 51(2)
of Additional Protocol I56—which the Trial Chamber determined to be
customary international law57— “states in clear language that civilians and the
civilian population as such should not be the object of attack. It does not
mention any exceptions. In particular, it does not contemplate derogating from
this rule by invoking military necessity.”58 Moreover, the Galić Appeals
Chamber specifically rejected a military-necessity-based challenge to the Trial
Chamber’s pronouncement of an absolute bar to targeting civilians in

49

Id. ¶ 265.
Id. ¶¶ 47–50.
51 Id. ¶¶ 134–42.
52 Id. ¶¶ 147–57.
53 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
54 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Ĉerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
55 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 129–30 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, supra note 53;
Prosecutor v. Kordić & Ĉerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2004).
56 Additional Protocol I, supra note 28.
57 Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, supra note 55, ¶ 45 (“The Trial Chamber recalls that [Article 51(2) of
Additional Protocol I] explicitly confirms the customary rule that civilians must enjoy general protection
against the danger arising from hostilities. The prohibition against attacking civilians stems from a
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction, which obliges warring
parties to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly to direct their operations only against military objectives.”).
58 Id. ¶ 44.
50
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upholding the Trial Chamber’s determination of General Galić’s guilt.59 The
ICTY’s affirmation that military necessity cannot overcome an absolute bar on
a specific method of warfare—targeting civilians—is an explicit, modern
rejection of kriegsraison.
II. DEFENSE OF THE ENHANCED INTERROGATION PROGRAM RELIES ON
KRIEGSRAISON
Despite international humanitarian law’s comprehensive rejection of
kriegsraison as an excuse for committing unlawful acts, the doctrine figures
prominently, if implicitly, in the defense of the United States’ enhanced
interrogation program since the release of the RDI report. Kriegsraison’s role
in defending the enhanced interrogation program should not be surprising.60
Kriegsraison formed part of the defense and justification of the enhanced
interrogation program from the very beginning—even before the program itself
was contemplated. This section explores the use of kriegsraison in the legal
and rhetorical justification of the enhanced interrogation program from its
inception, and concludes that kriegsraison is the crux of defenders’ efforts to
justify enhanced interrogation.
Kriegsraison was part of the incipient legal justification for the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques and tainted the legal analysis for treatment
of individuals detained in the course of the armed conflict between the United
States, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. As early as November 2001, when the CIA
first began researching potential legal defenses for utilizing interrogation
techniques viewed as torture by foreign governments, CIA lawyers drafted a
legal memorandum stating that the “CIA could argue that torture was
necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where
there is no other available means to prevent the harm.”61 In so far as the
individuals subject to torture were detained in the course of an armed conflict,

59 Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, supra note 55, ¶¶ 129–30 (“Galić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in
finding that the targeting of civilians cannot be justified by military necessity . . . The Appeals Chamber has
previously emphasized that ‘there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilians in customary
international law’ and that ‘the prohibition against attacking civilians and civilian objects may not be
derogated from because of military necessity.’ The Trial Chamber was therefore correct to hold that the
prohibition of attacks against the civilians and the civilian population ‘does not mention any exceptions [and]
does not contemplate derogating from this rule by invoking military necessity.’”).
60 Cf. Horton, supra note 20, at 577–78 (describing the Bush administration’s use of “military necessity”
to avoid the laws of war as an attempted resurrection of kriegsraison).
61 RDI REPORT, supra note 3, at 19 (internal quotations omitted).
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this proposed defense invokes kriegsraison by allowing military necessity to
supersede the law’s absolute prohibition on torture.
President George W. Bush’s February 2002 memorandum concerning the
“Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees”62 likewise exhibits
kriegsraison. In that memorandum, the President determined that “none of the
provisions of [the 1949 Geneva Conventions] apply to our conflict with al
Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because . . . al Qaeda
is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva,”63 and that “common Article 3 of
Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees because, among
other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common
Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflicts not of an international character.’”64
Notwithstanding the memorandum’s erroneous conclusion that Common
Article 3 does not apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees,65 it clearly invokes
the logic and language of kriegsraison: “[A]s a matter of policy, the United
States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the
extent . . . consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of Geneva.”66 That is, the principles of the Geneva Conventions—
not even the conventions themselves—were applicable only subject to the
exigencies of military necessity. Interestingly, DCI Tenet also invoked
kriegsraison in arguing against application of the February 2002 memorandum
to the Central Intelligence Agency in a letter to President Bush.67
Despite kriegsraison’s early presence in the legal analysis intended to
authorize the use of “interrogation techniques that were considered torture by
foreign governments,”68 the Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum
ultimately did not rely on it to explicitly excuse the use of enhanced

62 Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter George W. Bush Memorandum].
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 For an excellent deconstruction of this memorandum, see Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005).
66 George W. Bush Memorandum, supra note 62 (emphasis added). See also Horton, supra note 20, at
576–77.
67 S. REP. NO. 113-288, at 20 (2014) (citing an email to President George W. Bush (Feb. 1, 2002, 1:02:12
PM)) (“A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA be exempt from any application of
these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would ‘significantly hamper the ability of CIA to obtain
critical threat information necessary to save American lives’ . . . The attorney concluded that, if [the Geneva
principles did apply to CIA], ‘then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably
violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives.’”).
68 Id. at 19.
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interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah and other detainees. Instead, OLC’s
legal analysis turned on the absence of specific intent to inflict severe pain or
suffering on the part of interrogators, as well as the absence of severe pain and
suffering in fact.69 OLC’s unclassified opinion concerning enhanced
interrogation techniques also included a discussion of necessity and selfdefense as possible legal defenses for interrogators accused of torture for their
use of enhanced interrogation. That said, OLC premised its opinion on the
extreme danger of the post-9/11 period and the need for information to prevent
attacks and defeat al-Qaeda:
Zubaydah is one of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda
terrorist organization, with which the United States is currently
engaged in an international armed conflict following the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 . . .
The interrogation team is certain that he has additional information
that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information
regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia
and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United
States or against our interests overseas . . . Moreover, your
intelligence indicates that there is currently a level of “chatter” equal
to that which preceded the September 11 attacks. In light of the
information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat
you believe now exists, you wish to move the interrogations into
70
what you have described as an “increased pressure phase.”

Such an argument is the very essence of kriegsraison: “[T]he laws of war lose
their binding force in case of extreme necessity. Such a case [is] said to arise
when violation of the laws of war alone offers either a means of escape from
extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war—namely, the
overpowering of the opponent.”71
The OLC memorandum’s premise—that enhanced interrogation techniques
were necessary to defeat al-Qaeda and prevent additional attacks—and its
implicit adoption of kriegsraison, continues to animate the defense of
enhanced interrogation techniques in the wake of the release of the RDI report.
For example, former Vice President Dick Cheney recently argued that “the
techniques that we did, in fact, use . . . gave us the information we needed to be
69 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Office of Legal Counsel to John Rizzo,
Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al-Qaeda Operative 9–17 (Aug. 1,
2002).
70 Id. at 1.
71 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 232.
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able to safeguard the nation against further attacks and to be able to track
those guilty for 9/11 did, in fact, work,”72 and that the United States “did
exactly what we needed to be done in order to catch those who were guilty of
9/11 and to prevent a further attack.”73 Likewise, in a sweeping rebuttal of the
RDI report, three former CIA Directors and CIA Deputy Directors who
oversaw the enhanced interrogation report argued that:
[t]he program was invaluable in three critical ways: It led to the
capture of senior al Qaeda operatives, thereby removing them from
the battlefield. It led to the disruption of terrorist plots and prevented
mass casualty attacks, saving American and Allied lives. It added
enormously to what we knew about al Qaeda as an organization and
therefore informed our approaches on how best to attack, thwart and
74
degrade it.

John Yoo similarly defends the use of waterboarding on the basis that “[w]e
knew little about Al-Qaeda, and intelligence indicated that more attacks were
coming, perhaps using weapons of mass destruction.”75
These defenders of enhanced interrogation do not appear to proffer the
necessity of enhanced interrogation techniques as a legal excuse. Indeed, John
Yoo even lauds the RDI report for “mov[ing] the debate beyond legality to
effectiveness.”76 Instead, defenders assert the legality of the enhanced
interrogation program on the basis of opinions provided by the OLC77 and the
necessity of enhanced interrogation seems to provide a separate rhetorical
argument. For example, former Vice President Cheney defended the legality of
72 Meet the Press, Meet the Press Transcript-December 14, 2014, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2014, 12:16 PM)
[hereinafter Meet the Press] (emphasis added), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcriptdecember-14-2014-n268181 (interview with former Vice President Dick Cheney).
73 Id.
74 Tenet, Goss, Hayden et al., supra note 1.
75 Yoo, supra note 1. The architect of the enhanced interrogation program, James Mitchell, explained the
context surrounding the authorization to waterboard Abu Zubaydah as: “It was clear that there was a second
wave coming. There was [sic] all these fears about nuclear devices and anthrax and, you know, multiple
people dying and a catastrophic thing, and there was all this pressure not just from the CIA but from
Washington and everywhere. They were saying the gloves are off, you know, we have to take extraordinary
measures, that sort of stuff.” CIA Interrogation Architect Reacts To Senate Report, FOX NEWS (Aug. 30, 2015,
4:49 PM), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/12/16/cia-interrogation-architect-reacts-to-senate-report/
(emphasis added). Mitchell further assessed that the enhanced interrogation program saved lives: “I’m proud
of the work we did. We saved lives. They told us we did a good job, they told us we saved lives, and I believe
that we did.” Man Who Waterboarded 9/11 Mastermind: ‘If It Was Torture, I Would Be In Jail,’ FOX NEWS
(Aug. 30, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/12/17/man-who-waterboarded-11-master
mind-if-it-was-torture-would-be-in-jail/.
76 Yoo, supra note 1.
77 See generally Meet the Press, supra note 72.
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the enhanced interrogation program by pointing to opinions offered by the
OLC:
[W]e went specifically to [the Office of Legal Counsel] because we
did not want to cross that line into where we violating some
international agreement that we’d signed up to. They specifically
authorized and okayed, for example, exactly what we did. All of the
techniques that were authorized by the president were, in effect,
blessed by the Justice Department opinion that we could go forward
78
with those without, in fact, committing torture.

Similarly, after the RDI report’s release, John Yoo argued that:
[a]ttorneys in the Bush Justice Department, including me, reviewed
whether the CIA’s proposed interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, an Al
Qaeda planner captured in March 2002 in Pakistan, met that law . . .
Three reasons persuaded us to approve waterboarding. First, Al
Qaeda terrorists were not POWs under the Geneva Conventions,
because they fought for no nation and flouted the laws of war by
killing civilians and beheading prisoners (such as Daniel Pearl).
Second, the U.S. armed forces had used it in training tens of
thousands of officers and soldiers, without any physical injury or
long-term mental harm. Finally, the United States had suffered the
deaths of 3,000 civilians and billions of dollars in damage; we knew
little about Al Qaeda, and intelligence indicated that more attacks
79
were coming, perhaps using weapons of mass destruction.

Despite defenders’ apparent rhetorical reliance on necessity, for the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques to be lawful under international
humanitarian law (IHL), the techniques must be both militarily necessary and
otherwise lawful.80 Thus, while defenders’ necessity argument appears to be
merely rhetorical it must be performing legal work for them, too. They must
claim that (1) enhanced interrogation techniques are lawful; and (2) that
enhanced interrogation techniques are indispensable to achieving the
submission of al-Qaeda. But if defenders are wrong about the lawfulness of
enhanced interrogation techniques in the first instance, then the potentially
lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques becomes either plainly illegal
or salvageable only under the guise of a resurrected doctrine of kriegsraison.

78
79
80

Id.
Yoo, supra note 1.
Cf. BOVARNICK ET AL., supra note 17, at 129.
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In fact, defenders of the enhanced interrogation program are wrong about
the lawfulness of the program. What defenders do not acknowledge in their
public comments is that OLC opinions authorizing the enhanced interrogation
program—premised on the notion that the Geneva Conventions, including
Common Article 3, do not apply to members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban—have
been found to be invalid as a matter of Constitutional law,81 have been
withdrawn by the OLC,82 and resulted in a Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility determination that their authors perpetrated
professional misconduct in providing such opinions.83 Thus, defenders are left
either with no valid legal argument justifying enhanced interrogation or an
argument that the military necessity of enhanced interrogation overrides its
illegality.
The importance of military necessity to the defense of enhanced
interrogation techniques elucidates defenders’ emphasis on the effectiveness of
enhanced interrogation techniques. Were the enhanced interrogation
techniques not effective, then defenders could not establish that they were
necessary.84 Instead, the discomfort or pain—physical or psychological—
81

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–30 (2006).
Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A, at 2 (Dec. 30, 2004) (“We decided to withdraw the August 2002 Memorandum . . . . This
memorandum supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety.”). Although the December 30, 2004
memorandum concluded that use of the waterboard and other enhanced interrogation techniques do not violate
the U.S. torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, tellingly, it expressly did not consider whether such
techniques violate “the Geneva Conventions; the Uniform Code of Military Justice []; the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act []; and the War Crimes Act.” Id. at 2 n.6. “There is no exception under the
statute permitting torture to be used for a ‘good reason.’ Thus, a defendant’s motive (to protect national
security, for example) is not relevant to the question whether he has acted with the requisite specific intent
under the statute.” Id. at 17. See also John P. Mudd, Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with National
Security Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room (2004); Daniel B. Levin, Letter to John A. Rizzo
Concerning Use of the Waterboard (Aug. 6, 2004) (imposing new limits on the use of the waterboard to
conform with OLC’s revised view of the lawfulness of the technique).
83 OFFICE. OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF
“ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 11 (July 29, 2009). The “professional
misconduct” determination was subsequently downgraded to a “poor judgment” determination. Memorandum
from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Decision Regarding the Objections to the
Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into
the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s
Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 2 (Jan. 5, 2010). For a critique of the
reasoning behind the subsequent change in the sanction, see James Fallows, The OPR Report: This Era’s
‘Hiroshima,’ ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/02/the-opr-reportthis-eras-hiroshima/36313/.
84 Indeed, the absence of effect undermined Lieutenant Heinz Eck’s proffered defense of military
necessity in The Peleus Trial. See The Peleus Trial, in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION LAW
82
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inflicted on detainees subject to enhanced interrogation techniques would be
merely wanton. It is imperative that defenders of the program contest the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s conclusion that enhanced
interrogation was ineffective. Thus, former CIA Directors and Deputy
Directors who defend the enhanced interrogation report emphasize:
Once they had become compliant due to the interrogation program,
both Abu Zubaydah and KSM turned out to be invaluable sources on
the al Qaeda organization. We went back to them multiple times to
gain insight into the group. More than one quarter of the nearly 1,700
footnotes in the highly regarded 9/11 Commission Report in 2004
and a significant share of the intelligence in the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate on al Qaeda came from detainees in the
85
program, in particular Zubaydah and KSM.

It is also why defenders of the program ignore the Committee’s conclusion that
at least two dozen of the individuals subject to enhanced interrogation were
totally innocent and, as a result, subject to totally unnecessary and useless
torture.86
Even if enhanced interrogation were effective, defenders of the program are
unable to satisfy the lawful parameters of military necessity because the
program relied on techniques, such as waterboarding, that clearly violate the
laws of war. The goals articulated by defenders of the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques—preventing further attacks by al-Qaeda, removing alQaeda leaders from the battlefield, and acquiring critical information on the
REPORTS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 15–16, ¶ 2(iii) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1947). On March 13-14, 1944, Eck’s U-boat
sank the Peleus, an allied steamship, in the Atlantic and Eck subsequently ordered the surviving crew to be
killed while in the water. Id. at 3, ¶ 4 (“Eck . . . ordered the shooting and the throwing of hand grenades at the
rafts and the floating wreckage.”). Eck was charged with violating the laws of war for ordering the murder of
the surviving crew. Id. at 2, ¶ 2. He claimed that “the elimination of the traces of the ‘Peleus’ was
operationally necessary in order to save the U-boat.” Id. at 4, ¶ 5. According to Eck, “he had heard of cases
where the loss of the U-boat had actually been caused by the presence of survivors . . . He thought that the rafts
were a danger to him, first because they would show aeroplanes the exact spot of the sinking, and secondly
because rafts at that time of the war . . . could be provided with modern signalling communications.” Id. at 4–
5, ¶ 6. The Peleus court rejected Eck’s justification, noting that “[t]he firing went on for about five hours.” Id.
at 5, ¶ 6. Thus, rather than make way from the location of the sinking, for five hours the U-boat remained
surfaced and in the vicinity of the sinking, at clear risk of being spotted and attacked. Id. The court did not
have occasion to address the question of whether military necessity could overcome the laws of war—in this
case, killing the surviving crew of the Peleus—because the killing of the crew was not effective. Id. at 5,
¶ 2(iii)).
85 Tenet, Goss, Hayden et al., supra note 1.
86 In response to this point, former Vice President Cheney stated, “I have no problem as long as we
achieve our objective. And our objective is to get the guys who did 9/11 and it is to avoid another attack
against the United States.” Meet the Press, supra note 72.

FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL

2038

12/11/2015 1:10 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

organization itself—fit squarely within those measures which are indispensable
for securing the complete submission of the enemy as quickly as possible. But
waterboarding individuals detained in the course of an armed conflict is per se
unlawful because it constitutes torture. As such, it cannot be saved by lawful
military necessity, which is self-limited to measures that are otherwise
lawful.87 Instead, only an unlawful military necessity reconceived as excusing
violations of the laws of war—kriegsraison—could provide defenders of the
enhanced interrogation program with safe harbor.
CONCLUSION
Kriegsraison is a pernicious, lawless doctrine that holds within it the
potential to eviscerate the laws of war and give life to Cicero’s maxim, “[I]nter
arma enim silent leges.” By elevating the subjective determination of military
necessity above all other considerations, kriegsraison excuses all the means,
methods, and behaviors that international humanitarian law seeks to limit or
prohibit. As Elihu Root said more than a century ago, “[e]ither the doctrine of
kriegsraison must be abandoned definitely and finally, or there is an end of
international law, and in its place will be left a world without law.”88 It is for
precisely those reasons that kriegsraison has never been widely accepted; that
IHL has soundly rejected it since World War II; and that the concept itself
carries such a stigma.
But kriegsraison’s logic is also compelling—why should a state not be able
to do everything it believes is necessary to defeat its enemies, regardless of
what is prohibited by the law? Such is the Clausewitzian perspective on war89
87 It is important to highlight here that many defenders of the program do not conclude themselves that
waterboarding is legal. Instead, they point to determinations by the Attorney General and the U.S. Department
of Justice that enhanced interrogation was “consistent with U.S. policy, law and our treaty obligations.” Tenet,
Goss, Hayden et al., supra note 1; Meet the Press, supra note 72 (“Definitions, and one that was provided by
the Office of Legal Counsel, we went specifically to them because we did not want to cross that line into
where we violating some international agreement that we’d signed up to. They specifically authorized and
okayed, for example, exactly what we did. All of the techniques that were authorized by the president were, in
effect, blessed by the Justice Department opinion that we could go forward with those without, in fact,
committing torture.”). Those who do address the legality often assert that torture was carefully avoided, see,
e.g., Meet the Press, supra note 72 (former Vice President Dick Cheney argued, “[w]e were very careful to
stop short of torture”), or that what was authorized came up against the line of legality. Whatever the merits of
this legal hand-washing on the part of those responsible for implementing enhanced interrogation techniques,
the conclusion that waterboarding was lawful is incorrect as a matter of law.
88 Elihu Root, Opening Address at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 27, 1921), in 15 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. PROC. 1, 3 (1921).
89 See generally KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 3–5 (O.J. Matthijs Jolles trans., 1943); Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV.
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and its rejoinders multifarious. IHL exists to protect persons caught up in an
armed conflict and reduce unnecessary suffering. IHL compliance ensures
effective military operations.90 Failure to adhere to IHL may undermine good
order and discipline, reducing the effectiveness of a fighting force.91 Failure to
adhere to IHL may undermine mission success, as well.92 Finally, IHL
compliance protects the fighting force from moral injury.93
The enhanced interrogation program has yielded numerous examples
bearing out the negative results of kriegsraison. The breakdown in good order
and discipline is evident in the use of horrific interrogation techniques beyond
even those that were authorized and erroneously viewed as lawful at the time.94
Enhanced interrogation techniques have undermined our efforts to defeat alQaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.95 And, of course, at least twenty-six

INT’L L.J. 49, 63–64 (1994) (“What leader would allow his country to be destroyed because of international
law?”) (quoting German Chancellor von Bismark).
90 Stephen W. Preston, Foreword to LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at ii (“Similarly, the law of
war’s prohibitions on torture and unnecessary destruction are consistent with the practical insight that such
actions ultimately frustrate rather than accomplish the mission.”). See also LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note
10, at 1055–56.
91 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1055–56; BLANK & NOONE, supra note 15, at 10.
92 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1055–56; BLANK & NOONE, supra note 15, at 11.
93 E.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40–41 (1970) (“[An]
even more important basis of the laws of war is that they are necessary to diminish the corrosive effect of
mortal combat on the participants. War does not confer a license to kill for personal reasons–to gratify
perverse impulses, or to put out of the way anyone who appears obnoxious, or to whose welfare the soldier is
indifferent. War is not a license at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of the state; it does not countenance
the infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge. Unless troops are trained and required to draw the
distinction between military and nonmilitary killings, and to retain such respect for the value of life that
unnecessary death and destruction will continue to repel them, they may lose the sense for that distinction for
the rest of their lives. The consequence would be that many returning soldiers would be potential murderers.”).
94 E.g., Yoo, supra note 1 (“If some CIA interrogators went beyond these methods, they would not have
received Justice Department approval; they could have been disciplined, even prosecuted.”). The RDI Report
details various interrogation techniques employed that went beyond those that were authorized by the Justice
Department. RDI REPORT, supra note 3, at xxi.
95 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, Washington, D.C. (May 21,
2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-2109/ (“I know some have argued that brutal methods like waterboarding were necessary to keep us safe. I could
not disagree more. As Commander-in-Chief, I see the intelligence. I bear the responsibility for keeping this
country safe. And I categorically reject the assertion that these are the most effective means of
interrogation . . . What’s more, they undermine the rule of law. They alienate us in the world. They serve as a
recruitment tool for terrorists, and increase the will of our enemies to fight us, while decreasing the will of
others to work with America. They risk the lives of our troops by making it less likely that others will
surrender to them in battle, and more likely that Americans will be mistreated if they are captured. In short,
they did not advance our war and counterterrorism efforts—they undermined them, and that is why I ended
them once and for all.”).
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of those individuals detained by the CIA, some of whom were subject to
EITs—including one who died due to his treatment—were innocent.96
Appropriately labeling the argument invoked by defenders of the enhanced
interrogation program as kriegsraison should give the program’s defenders
pause. It should spur them to reconsider their argument, consider its
provenance, and consider the reasons for its universal rejection since World
War II. Even if the mere label kriegsraison is not sufficient to shame the
program’s defenders into reconsideration, the fact that the logic of kriegsraison
led the United States to employ techniques—e.g., waterboarding—after 9/11
that it had determined to be illegal a century earlier should be. In either event,
we should never have reached a debate over whether torture was an effective
means of warfare—and we should cease entertaining that argument
immediately—continuing to do so perpetuates an assault on the rule of law
generally and on international humanitarian law specifically.

96 RDI REPORT, supra note 3, at xxi. This is not to suggest that guilt would justify the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques any more than military necessity does.

